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Why do states intervene in other countries' conflicts as mediators? The main answer to this question 
in the mediation literature is that states care about conflict outcomes and mediation is an attempt 
to influence these outcomes. In this thesis, I argue that domestic political conditions in a country 
also have an effect on its likelihood of attempting mediation. I propose that leaders are more likely 
to become a mediator when they feel vulnerable because of poor performance in domestic politics 
or economy. More specifically, I expect politically vulnerable leaders to use mediation as a tool to 
raise their domestic popularity. I test the plausibility of this prediction by conducting linear 
regression analysis on how domestic political factors affect OECD countries’ mediation attempts 
between 1950 and 2000. I do not find consistent evidence of a relationship between mediation 
attempts and domestic factors. Instead, the results show that mediation attempts become less likely 
when domestic conditions are poorer. Although the findings are contrary to my hypotheses, this 
thesis contributes to the literature by showing that countries that are stronger in economic, military 
and, political terms are more likely to become mediators.  
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ÖZET 
 
İÇ SİYASAL FAKTÖRLERİN ARABULUCULUK FAALİYETLERİ ÜZERİNE ETKİSİ 
 
 
ESRA BİÇER 
 
Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Aralık 2017 
 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Kerim Can Kavaklı 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Arabuluculuk, uluslararası uyuşmazlık, dış politika, iç politika. 
 
Devletler neden diğer ülkelerin uyuşmazlıklarına arabuluculuk yaparlar? Arabuluculuk 
literatüründeki bu sorunun ana cevabı, devletlerin uyuşmazlıkların sonuçlarını önemsediği ve 
arabuluculuğun bu sonuçları etkilemek için bir girişim olduğu yönündedir. Bu tezde, bir ülkedeki 
iç siyasi koşulların ülkenin arabuluculuk yapma kapasitesini ve istekliliğini etkilediği iddia 
edilmiştir. Ülkelerdeki liderlerin iç siyasal performansları göz önüne alındığında, kendilerini 
siyasal olarak zayıf gören liderlerin, arabulucu olarak dış politikada varlık göstermeye daha yatkın 
oldukları önerilmektedir. Liderler dış politika faaliyetlerini siyasi pozisyonlarını korumak adına bir 
araç olarak kullanmaya eğilimli oldukları için, arabuluculuğu da bir siyasi başarı örneği olarak 
kullanabilecekleri öngörülmüştür. Bu önerinin güvenilirliğini test etmek adına 1950-2000 yılları 
arasında OECD ülkelerinin arabuluculuk girişimlerinin iç siyasal faktörlerden nasıl etkilendiği 
üzerine doğrusal regresyon analizi yapılmıştır. Bu tezde arabuluculuk faaliyeti ve iç siyasal 
koşullar arasında bir ilişki tespit edilememiştir. Bunun yerine bu tezde bulunan sonuçlar, iç siyasal 
koşullar liderlerin siyasal performansının düşük olduğunu göstermesi durumunda arabuluculuk 
faaliyetine katılma oranının düştüğünü göstermektedir. Her ne kadar sonuçlar hipotezleri 
desteklemese de bu tez, ülkelerin ekonomik, askeri ve siyasi bakımından güçlü olmasının, 
arabulucu ülke olma ihtimalini güçlendirdiğini göstererek literatüre katkı sağlamıştır.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Third-party mediation has become the most preferred conflict prevention and resolution 
method after the end of the Cold War (Jacob Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Frazier & Dixon, 2009; 
Nagel & Clayton, 2017). Individuals, states and governmental and non-governmental organizations 
can take part in the conflict resolution process as mediating parties. However, states are the most 
common type of mediators in international dispute resolution (Jacob Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; 
Greig & Diehl, 2012). There are many arguments about the motivations of states for engaging in 
international conflicts as a third-party mediator. Zartman and Touval (2001) argues that although 
third parties intend to ensure peace, their main driving motive is their self-interests. Touval (2003) 
claims that although countries intend to bring peace for the conflict, success of peaceful settlement 
in mediation is usually a secondary consideration for them.  Greig and Reagon (2008) found that 
the probability of state-led mediation increases if states believe that they will have some benefits 
in the outcome. States may pursue a variety of goals: to keep stability/balance in the region, to have 
important role in future relations with conflicting parties or, to reduce spillover-effects that directly 
affect neighboring regions.  
 In this study, I explore whether a leader’s domestic political interests influence his or her 
country’s mediation attempts. The literature on international conflict recognizes leaders’ domestic 
political incentives as an important factor. Leaders are inclined to use foreign policy for their own 
political survival (Putnam, 1988). In particular, if political leaders display a poor domestic political 
performance, they need to have a successful record in international affairs to compensate for it. 
Accordingly, leaders tend to use foreign policy activities as tools for achieving their domestic 
political outcomes. In the literature, mostly the political use of force has been studied as a foreign 
policy tool. However, third-party mediation which is initiated for political purposes of leaders has 
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been overlooked by scholars. Touval (2003) suggests that mediation studies need to evaluate 
mediation as part of foreign policy to understand leaders’ strategic actions better within the 
international and domestic political systems. 
Todhunter (2012) applies this idea to the US context and argues that when US presidents 
feel vulnerable in domestic politics and there is a strong opposition in the Congress, they are more 
inclined to engage in mediation. He finds evidence for his argument by analyzing US mediation 
attempts between 1945 and 1995.  
In my study, my goal is to evaluate the validity of Todhunter’s argument for a broader range 
of countries and years. I examine third-party mediation as a foreign policy strategy that is shaped 
by domestic politics and specifically argue that leaders are more likely to engage in mediation in 
order to cover their poor domestic political performance. The main research question of my study 
is whether the domestic political situation in a country affects its mediation attempts. I examine 
mediation attempts by OECD countries between 1950 and 2000 and study the link between 
domestic political factors and international mediation attempts. Specifically, I analyze economic 
performance, election cycle and, public approval as key aspects of domestic politics. 
In this study, I do not find strong support for a relationship between domestic political 
factors and state mediation. My analyses do not provide evidence that leaders who feel vulnerable 
domestically tend to become a mediator in international conflicts. What I find is that if there is 
strong public dissatisfaction against a government, then its leader is less likely to attempt 
mediation. In addition, I find that major powers and countries that are stronger militarily and 
economically are more likely to attempt mediation.  
This study proceeds as follows: In the next section, I present a brief summary of previous 
literature on the third-party mediation and explain my theory. The third section provides a 
discussion of my research design, dataset and my statistical analyses. In the fourth section, main 
results of my analyses are presented. In the final chapter I conclude with a discussion of the findings 
and their implications. 
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THIRD-PARTY MEDIATION: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I review the existing literature on when there is a need for third-party 
involvement and when states are inclined to be a mediator. 
The nature and diversity of international conflicts have changed over time. Since the end of 
the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts, the number of international crises and the number of 
genocides have declined (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009a). However, we see a dramatic rise of 
intrastate conflict in the post-World War II era (Conflict type data from UCDP 2017.)1. The rise of 
intrastate conflict has forced scholars to modify the meaning of international conflict by adding 
internationalized intrastate conflict in the definition (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009a). 
Internationalized intrastate conflict refers to civil wars in which outside intervention is involved. 
In this thesis, I focus on mediation attempts in both interstate and internationalized intrastate 
conflicts. 
Conflict resolution has become a popular field after the Cold War era; we have seen more 
effort to solve international problems and more concern with maintaining international security 
(Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009a). In the Cold War era, the international system saw the world 
through the eyes of Realism. Therefore, state sovereignty and their interests were priority in the 
conflict resolution, and there was no attention on non-state actors. After the end of bipolar world 
order, human security came to the forefront. Hence, shifts in the nature of international politics 
require diversity of conflict resolution perspectives (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009b). Conflict 
resolution tactics can range from softer methods like talking, negotiating, mediating, to more 
coercive methods like economic, political or even military force.  
                                                          
1 http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/667/c_667494-l_1-k_armed-conflict-by-type--1946-2016.pdf, 16.10.2017. 
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In a state-centric Westphalian System, negotiation was the most preferred conflict 
resolution tool (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009a, p. 8). Negotiation involves direct 
communication between two or more opposing parties to settle a mutually acceptable agreement 
without the presence of a third-party facilitator. However, third-party intervention has become 
increasingly common after the Cold War period. In Figure 1, we can see that third-party 
interventions can vary from arbitration to coercive and non-coercive mediation. Arbitration is “the 
voluntary submission of a dispute to a third party for settlement by the making of an award which 
will bind the parties” (Wallace-Bruce, 1998, p. 63). The arbitrator is the most powerful third-party 
role because after a careful examination of both party’s evidence, the final decision is declared by 
an arbitrator and the decision is binding and cannot be appealed. Apart from the arbitration, there 
is another international law-based and binding form of third-party intervention, which is 
adjudication or judicial settlement. The main difference between adjudication and arbitration is 
arbitration tends to be on an ad hoc basis, while in adjudication, the process is managed by an 
existing established international body like the International Court of Justice or European Court of 
Human Rights. However, both intervention models solve conflicts according to established 
international legal principles (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001, pp. 47-55).  
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THIRD-PARTY 
ARBITRATION 
 
 
 
  NEGOTIATION  
 
 
 
MEDIATION 
THIRD PARTY 
  
 COERCIVE    NON-COERCIVE 
 Enforcement    Pure mediation/Facilitation 
 Non-forcible coercion   Conciliation/Problem-Solving 
 Mediation with muscle  Good offices 
 
Figure 1: Coercive and non-coercive third-party intervention2 
Definition and Functions of Mediation 
In this study, I am concerned primarily with mediation, which is one of the non-violent 
ways of conflict management by third-parties. Bercovitch emphasized in his book that mediation 
is the most effective conflict resolution method in the twenty-first century and, “by far the most 
common form of peaceful third-party intervention in international conflicts” (Jacob Bercovitch, 
1984, p. 131; Jacob Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006, p. 5). There was a 64 percent increase in the 
number of mediation attempts in the 1990s, when compared to 1945-1989 (Greig & Diehl, 2012). 
In addition, Bercovitch’s International Conflict Management Dataset shows that mediation was the 
preferred method in almost 60 percent of international disputes between 1945-2003 (Figure 2). The 
purpose of mediation is to bring the conflict to a settlement that is acceptable for both sides 
(Zartman & Touval, 1996).  It is all voluntary agreement and the result is non-binding for parties 
(Raymond & Kegley, 1985, p. 34). There are plenty of definitions of mediation but they have a 
                                                          
2 Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse 'Contemporary Conflict Resolution', p. 23. 
PARTY B PARTY A 
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common core: related parties come together to understand needs and expectations of other sides 
and express their ideas to find a peaceful solution. Once mediation is accepted by the warring 
parties, the intervention method can be fairly passive by transferring information from one side to 
the other or active by offering promises of political and economic support (Jacob Bercovitch & 
Gartner, 2006, p. 331). A mediator is able to increase the likelihood of transforming conflict 
structure, establishing mutual communication between conflicted parties, and understanding other 
party’s interests and needs. This allows opponents to adopt a new peaceful approach towards each 
other and conflict itself (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012, pp. 224-230). 
 
Figure 2: ICM, 1945-2003 
In coercive mediation, the mediator uses powerful incentives, both carrots and sticks, to 
persuade parties to come to a settlement. We can give US President Jimmy Carter’s mediation 
efforts in Camp David as an example of coercive mediation which can also be called as “power 
mediation” or “mediation with muscles” (Greig & Diehl, 2012, p. 9; Richmond, 2001, p. 58). He 
used the US resources of foreign aid and guaranteed security as a leverage for Israel and Egypt and 
he said he would withdraw the process if they failed to solve the dispute before the deadline he 
assigned (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012, p. 229). Softer methods such as conciliation, facilitation or 
problem-solving workshops can be classified as non-coercive mediations. In this kind of mediation, 
mediator can help information flow between parties, arrange discussion platforms, basically 
provide “good offices” for problem-solving and help adversaries to start negotiation process. In 
this type, the role of a mediator is to get the disputants to focus on underlying interests (the things 
7 
 
they really need or want) more than their initial opening positions (what they initially say they need 
or want).  
Mediation has important advantages if we compare it with more legal or formal resolution 
methods. First, force is not used to pursue participants; it is a voluntary process so both parties can 
surpass the trust issue more than in other management options. They can easily accept the solution, 
which makes the solution more stable (Mitchell & Webb, 1988, p. 10). Second, mediator neither 
serves in favor of one side of a conflict nor is a direct participant to the ongoing disputes; the 
mediator is there to find a common ground that satisfies as many disputants as possible (Greig & 
Diehl, 2012, p. 18). Third, the outcome is not binding, opponents have a choice not to accept 
mediator’s ideas. That is also well-suited to parties’ needs to feel not threatened. Also, it is an ad 
hoc process, specific for just a particular case so it is flexible, parties can decide themselves about 
the ground rules. Moreover, underlying causes of conflict can become apparent because mediator 
is more flexible to meet with parties not publicly (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1981). Lastly, mediation 
is less time consuming than long-standing and rigid legal processes.  
There can be various reasons behind the willingness of conflicted parties to accept 
assistance from a third party. First reason might be that belligerent parties have reached a “hurting 
stalemate”, which occurs when parties face a deadlock that none of them can win or lose and they 
need a third-party to find a solution (Zartman, 2000, p. 228). Second, they might realize that their 
gains from the cooperation will be more than their conflict-related loss (Beardsley, 2010; Jacob 
Bercovitch, 1984; Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2001; Greig & Diehl, 2012). Apart from these 
reasons, one of the conflicted parties might seek a mediator with the expectation that mediator will 
justify their reasons for conflict (Jacob Bercovitch, 1984). In addition, parties might see mediation 
process as an expression of their justification to the international sphere and try to gain appreciation 
from other states for looking a peaceful solution (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009b; Zartman, 
2001). 
Motives of Mediators 
Deciding who will be a mediator is an important issue. There is a number of choices such 
as individuals, great, mid-size or small states, international or national organizations and, non-
governmental organizations (Jacob Bercovitch, 2011; Vukovic, 2014). Every type of mediator has 
some advantages and disadvantages according to conflict’s characteristics. For example, the most 
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flexible mediators are individual mediators because they do not have a responsibility to any 
government, so they seem like the most neutral ones. Generally, they use their status such as their 
business, academic or political background as a leverage (Todhunter, 2012, p. 35). President 
Carter’s efforts in Camp David accord is one of a good example. Camp David Accords is the peace 
treaty, which make an end of three decades of hostilities between Egypt and Israel in 1978. Mostly 
individual mediators use communication and facilitation strategies (Jacob Bercovitch & Schneider, 
2000, p. 147). However, individual mediators are not the dominant preference in international 
arena. In the last decade, institutions and organizations have become increasingly popular 
mediators. They use different techniques such as multi-track or track-II diplomacy.3 However, 
most of them lack political power and more often they focus on the socio-economic issues in the 
conflict. One of the unique advantages that they have is opponent parties approach them in a less 
suspicious way relative to state officials. United Nations, Amnesty International, Carter Center, 
African Union and, The International Committee of the Red Cross are examples of international 
and regional organization mediators. However, in this study, I focus on state mediatiors. Because 
of their economic and political capacity, states are most requested mediators by countries (Jacob 
Bercovitch & Gartner, 2006; Greig & Diehl, 2012). Moreover, states are the most common 
initiators of mediation process by initiating roughly 50% of all mediations (J. Bercovitch & Fretter, 
2007; Jacob Bercovitch & Schneider, 2000). Lastly, focusing on state actors limits the scope of this 
thesis and makes the project more feasible.  
In Figure 3, we can see that over the years both the number of disputes and state-led 
mediation increase, which means that state mediation and disputes have a close relationship. Even 
though their neutrality is questionable for parties, they need states’ resources and leverage 
capacities when they cannot provide these resources themselves. Actors who mediate in the name 
of a state can vary from junior ministers and bureaucrats to high-level representatives including 
presidents, prime ministers, secretary of states, or foreign ministers (Nagel & Clayton, 2017).  
 
                                                          
3 Track II and multi-track approach to conflict resolution are unofficial and nongovernmental actions. The 
negotiations process can be managed by religious institutions, academics, former government officials, non-
governmental organizations, humanitarian organizations or think tanks. 
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Figure 3: Molly, when states mediate (Data from ICM) 
States have motivations to become a mediator other than just providing peace. States are 
rational actors in the international arena and calculate costs and benefits of their actions (M.Melin, 
2013). If the cost of mediation process is higher than its benefit, it is unlikely that states would 
accept to engage in conflict resolution. (Beber, 2012, p. 406; Zartman, 2000, p. 156). Mostly, states 
are afraid of escalation and spill-over effect of conflict, which means conflict can circulate through 
the neighboring countries and pull more parties into the conflict (Collier, 2003; Gleditsch, 2007). 
Therefore, they prefer to initiate a mediation process to stop or, at least, to reduce the potential 
negative effects of conflict. In this regard, mediation efforts by states to manage crises after the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia can be a good example. The other reason might be that being a member 
state of a regional or an international organization lets a state to attempt mediation especially if the 
conflict occurred among the other members of the organization (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 
2009a). The Turkish mediation attempts to the conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan, two 
Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) member-states, can be given as an example. Moreover, 
mediator state may aim to enhance its influence over the conflicted parties or to prevent its rivals 
from enhancing their influence by being a third-party. For example, Soviet mediation attempt to 
India-Pakistan conflict derived from the fear of China’s occasion to extend its influence over 
Pakistan and become a threat to Soviets (Zartman, 2008, p. 157).  In addition, mediation is less 
costly if we compare it with military actions and, domestic public opinion supports more peaceful 
processes because of increasing humanitarian concerns especially after the Cold War period 
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(Zartman, 2008, p. 158). All these reasons show us that states do not only approach the mediation 
purely to prove peace and stability in international politics. On the contrary, states are likely to be 
interested in being a mediator if they have care about the outcome.  
This discussion brings me to the argument that mediation is a part of domestic and foreign 
policy and the success of mediation may be a secondary concern for states (Touval, 2003). Foreign 
policy actions are determined under the influence of national and international actors and practiced 
by government officials with the aim of achieving domestic and international objectives. When a 
leader decides on the foreign policy strategy, domestic factors constitute a big part of this 
framework. Putnam (1988) explains in his two-level game theory model that leaders who make 
decisions for political survival are affected by both international and domestic political spheres. 
The domestic factors that affect foreign policy decisions can be economic performance, national 
political institutions, societal structures, domestic oppositions or public awareness (Todhunter, 
2012). Studies show that public is aware and interested in foreign policy affairs, and contrary to 
popular belief, and public opinion on foreign policy is a strong determinant of their voting 
behaviors (Aldrich, Gelpi, Feaver, Reifler, & Sharp, 2006). Accordingly, Putnam (1988) claims 
that sometimes leaders use foreign policy to empower their domestic political standing. Moreover, 
studies suggest that this goal seems more important than anything else for a leader (de Mesquita, 
Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2005; Neustadt, 1964). Because the most important objective for a 
leader is political survival, they can use foreign policy as a tool to divert public attention from 
domestic problems by channeling patriotism (James & Oneal, 1991; Todhunter, 2012). In addition, 
although there are different camps in the government to stop a leader from making socio-economic 
initiatives, when it comes to foreign policy, interests of a state beyond the ideological lines 
(Schultz, 2001). However, literature generally focuses on political use of military force for 
explaining the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy actions (Foster, 2006; 
Levy, 1988; Meernik, 2001). Jentleson (1992) presents that public have the ability to calculate the 
potential risks to use of force. They act hesitantly in this regard and do not fully support this 
strategy. Therefore, governments tend to use non-military foreign policy options such as the 
provision of foreign aid, the use of sanctions or mediation. Mediation is a less costly, non-binding 
and, more peaceful activity than the other methods. It is less costly because mediation needs limited 
resources and poses no risk to the military force or lives of citizens. Thus, I suggest that third-party 
mediation is one of the attractive foreign policy options for countries to reach their political targets. 
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Especially, for governments that do not have many resources, mediation can be a good option for 
gaining some economic and political resources and earning a reputation as a peace maker in the 
international politics (M.Melin, 2013, p. 79; Zartman & Touval, 1996, p. 446). To be able to 
persuade the conflicted parties come to the same table and start the negotiation process may be 
seen as a of high-profile foreign policy success for a leader.  
Gap in the Literature: A Foreign Policy Perspective on Mediation 
Scholars studying on mediation criticize that mediation analyses adopting foreign policy 
perspective has been neglected in the literature (Touval, 2003). Most studies emphasize that 
mediation is a widely used strategy to reach a political achievement (Berovitch, 2002; Kleiboer, 
2002), however, they do not provide consistent empirical findings. While the literature explores 
numerous arguments explaining when mediation occurs, how international mediation produces 
successful outcomes, and what external factors motivate states to engage in mediation process; 
only limited scholarship has explored when states are more likely to become a mediator regarding 
country’s domestic politics. Touval (2003) also claims that perceiving mediation as a foreign policy 
tool means that strategies and goals of states during mediation processes are frequently shaped by 
concerns which are exogeneous to the conflict. In addition, (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009c) 
emphasize this view as key element in explaining the reasons why states are more likely to become 
a mediator. 
Todhunter (2012) adopts this conceptual framework in his dissertation and claims that 
mediator’s strategic move is effected by domestic political factors and leader’s performance. The 
study argues when the government’s feeling of domestic vulnerability increases, the number of 
mediation tend to increase. Because leaders are likely to be mediators when they assume that it is 
beneficial to cover up their poor domestic political performance and when government has a strong 
opposition in the assembly that restrains legislative power of government. He measures mediation 
attempts by looking at three different components: mediation initiatives by years, mediator types 
and mediator strategy. Mediator type means mediator’s rank and position in the government. It gets 
media attention because the media focuses on high-level government officials’ action in 
international politics. More media attention means more coverage of this action publicly. Mediator 
strategy is also an indicator of whether governments use this intervention for a long-term peace 
building or short-term benefit. His argument is mediators use more manipulative strategies to yield 
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the peace settlement quickly because they need short term results to use it for their own political 
survival especially when the elections are close. Todhunter measures domestic political 
performance and constraints by looking at economic performance, approval ratings from the public 
and, congressional opposition. He considers the election proximity as another measure because he 
thinks governments in power would like to preserve their places and mediation could be one strong 
incentive to help them to improve their domestic standing.  He tests these hypotheses looking at 
the US mediation attempts between 1945 and 1995. The results support to the argument that 
domestic political conditions influence political leaders when they have an opportunity to engage 
in the mediation process. However, Todhunter’s results are only applicable for powerful states with 
the presidential system because he only examines the US mediation attempts. A broader study is 
needed in the mediation literature. Inspired by Todhunter’s study, this thesis attempts to examine 
the influence of domestic political conditions on the motives of mediator by referring OECD 
countries’ mediation attempts. 
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THEORY: 
FROM DOMESTIC POLITICS TO MEDIATION ACTIVITIES 
 
 
 
As discussed in the earlier section, mediation is the most popular type of conflict 
management method and powerful states are the most popular mediators (Jacob Bercovitch & 
Schneider, 2000). There are many reasons for states to be a mediating party, however, the most 
notable and controversial one is that to pursue political achievements in international politics 
(Touval, 1992). Touval (2003) argues that international mediation can be a foreign policy which 
allows states to gain domestic and international support.  
Following Todhunter (2012), mediation attempts of OECD countries are analyzed in this 
thesis by examining the number of mediation, mediator type, and mediation strategy. There are 
various domestic factors which might affect government foreign policy actions. GDP growth is the 
most appropriate and widely used indicator to measure government performance because it 
represents long-term national economic outputs. Although it is influenced by global issues, it is 
also highly influenced by government policies. People often hold the incumbent government 
responsible for poor economic performance and tend to punish them at the ballot box. There are 
many studies providing a support for the argument that economic conditions are very influential 
on voting behavior of citizens (Alesina & Rosenthal, 1995; Alvarez, Nagler, & Willette, 2000; 
Palmer & Whitten, 2000). Thus, when governments are challenged by poor economic performance, 
they incline to take foreign policy actions to divert their citizens’ attention from economic issues 
(Richards, Morgan, Wilson, Schwebach, & Young, 1993). I use this rationale to propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H1a: States are more likely to engage in mediation if their GDP growth rate is declining. 
Consistent with the argument above, when a leader needs to divert public attention, media 
coverage plays an important role. Because mass media functions as a bridge between public and 
policymakers. It is the main source for public to gain information about foreign policy issues 
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(Soroka, 2003). As expected, high ranked officials such as presidents, prime ministers, secretary 
of states, or foreign ministers are likely to take media attention. Thus, I predict that governments 
send high-ranked officials to the mediation processes to take more attention from the media: 
H1b: States are more likely to send high ranked representatives to the mediation process 
if their GDP growth rate is declining. 
As I have discussed, because of political survival is the main concern for a leader, they are 
more likely to find short-term policy success when they face with domestic and international 
challenges. Yuen and Werner (2005) point out that third-party interventions where mediators use 
their power to manipulate opposing parties to make an end the conflict result in short-term peace 
building. Bear this finding in mind, one can assume when leaders feel vulnerable in domestic 
politics they tend to use manipulative strategies in mediation and I test this argument with below 
hypothesis: 
H1c: States are more likely to use manipulative intervention strategies if their GDP 
growth rate is declining. 
An upcoming election is an opportunity for the public to evaluate the government 
performance during its tenure. Rational behavior models suggest that in an election environment, 
citizens vote by calculating governments’ failures and successes (Carmines & Stimson, 1980; 
Kramer, 1971). Thus, governments need to convince the public about their success in both domestic 
and foreign policy when election is close.  Being a mediator might be a good political opportunity 
for governments which want to be reelected to demonstrate their power and dovishness. The 
literature suggests that political leaders abstain from using military force in their foreign policy 
actions when they are not confident about their likelihood of winning the next election (Chiozza & 
Goemans, 2003; Gaubatz, 1991; Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & J.D.Morrow, 2003). This can be a 
reason that they are more likely to adopt peaceful strategies in their foreign policy actions. In 
addition, I use the same logic with above hypotheses about mediator rank and strategy. It is 
expected that governments are more likely to announce their leadership in foreign policy through 
mass media coverage and to use manipulative strategies to reach a solution in a short time. 
Therefore, considering these assumptions I reach my following hypotheses: 
H2a: States are more likely to engage in mediation if there will be an election in the 
coming year. 
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H2b: States are more likely to send high ranked representatives to the mediation process 
if there will be an election in the coming year. 
H2c: States are more likely to use manipulative intervention strategies if there will be an 
election in the coming year. 
Another significant domestic factor that might affect government policies is public approval 
rates. Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) found that if citizens appreciate government’s foreign policy 
activities, they are more likely to give higher approval rates to the government. For this reason, I 
expect that leaders can benefit from foreign policy opportunities to avoid lower public approval 
rates due to their poor domestic performance. As there is no sufficient public approval data for all 
OECD countries, I include the number of anti-government demonstrations as a public approval 
indicator. This indicator displays public dissatisfaction about government’s policies. As I argued 
regarding economic performance and elections, using higher mediator rank should increase media 
attention and manipulative strategies should provide short term result which are beneficial for 
leaders.  
With this information above, following hypotheses are established:  
H3a: States are more likely to engage in mediation if there are strong anti-government 
demonstrations. 
H3b: States are more likely to send high ranked representatives if there are strong anti-
government demonstrations. 
H3c: States are more likely to use manipulative intervention strategies if there are strong 
anti-government demonstrations. 
As it is stated before GDP growth is a good proxy for popularity of government. Moreover, 
if GDP growth rate is low and there is an election soon, I expect that government takes actions to 
improve its political standing and to keep its incumbent position. Otherwise, it is likely that 
government loses its popularity and this causes a failure in the election (Lewis-Beck, 1990). That’s 
why I expect to find the interaction of these two variables will affect my dependent variables. I 
intend to analyze this interaction as below: 
H4a: States are more likely to engage in mediation attempts if GDP per capita growth 
rate is low and election is close. 
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H4b: States are more likely to send high ranked representatives if GDP per capita 
growth rate is low and election is close. 
H4c: States are more likely to use manipulative intervention strategies if GDP per capita 
growth rate is low and election is close. 
Since governments seek to preserve their places, they concern about their public approval 
rates more when the election is close. Therefore, it is expected from governments to take some 
actions in order to increase their popularity in election time. Mediation can be a low-risk option to 
demonstrate their policy success. At least, it might be helpful to strengthen the idea that government 
is still powerful in international politics. Accordingly, I expect the given interaction will affect the 
frequency of mediation activity: 
H5a: States are more likely to engage in mediation attempts if there are strong anti-
government demonstrations when election is close. 
H5b: States are more likely to send high ranked representatives if there are strong anti-
government demonstrations when election is close. 
H5c: States are more likely to use manipulative intervention strategies if there are strong 
anti-government demonstrations when election is close. 
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DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I describe my research design and present the logic for selecting my 
variables. First, the structure of dataset and how to test methodologically the relationship between 
domestic political situation and mediation attempts are explained. Second, key dependent, 
independent and control variables are discussed in detail.  
The main goal of this study is to analyze the relationship between a country’s domestic 
politics and its willingness to mediate conflicts in other countries. Primary argument is that leaders 
may attempt to use mediation when they feel vulnerable in domestic political environment in their 
country. To test this argument, 23 OECD countries’ mediation attempts from 1950 until 2000 are 
examined on an annual basis. This time period is chosen because of data availability. Also, the 
scope of this analysis is limited to OECD countries for three reasons. Firstly, it makes the study 
more feasible because coding and arranging all mediation attempts for all countries consume a lot 
of time. Second, it increases confidence level to generalize validity of the results because these 
countries share enough commonalities as they are democratic countries with market economies. 
Also, economic indicators to test domestic vulnerability is much more available for these countries. 
The unit of this analysis is country-year data and in total, there are 1173 country-year observations 
formed by 23 countries and 51 years. Currently OECD has 35 member states, but 7 of them are 
excluded because they became members after 2000. Besides, Czech Republic, Denmark, Iceland, 
Ireland, Korea and Luxembourg are excluded because they have no state mediation record between 
the years of 1950-2000. 
In this thesis, Jacob Bercovitch’s (1999) International Conflict Management (ICM) dataset 
is benefited as a primary source of conflict resolution behavior. ICM is a comprehensive dataset 
that fulfils the needs of systematic empirical data on international conflict management events. 
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ICM contains different international conflicts, belligerent parties and conflict management 
mechanisms occurred from 1945 through to 2003. These management mechanisms include 
mediation, negotiation, arbitration, or referral to some UN action. The dataset provides extensive 
information on mediation characteristics including dates, mediator strategies, duration of 
mediation, mediator identity and outcomes of mediation. In the dataset, 309 conflicts and 3676 
conflict management attempts were coded. In the dataset, international conflict is identified as “an 
organized and continuous militarized conflict, or a demonstration of intention to use military force 
involving at least one state.” (Jacob Bercovitch, 1999, p. 1). Dataset determines the characteristics 
of conflicts by deciding whether they pose a threat to international stability and peace or not. In 
addition, dataset includes internationalized civil conflicts because these conflicts have international 
aspects with foreign troops, refuge flows, military or economic assistance. Thus, they can be a 
potential threat to international stability. Apart from that, ICM dataset has a very low (less than 10) 
fatalities threshold when coding a conflict. These approaches give a chance to strengthen this 
analysis because mediation is a resolution method which can also be applied to resolve non-violent 
conflicts and dataset does not neglect them.   
The dependent variables are the number of mediation attempts, mediator rank and position 
and, mediator strategy. These variables are derived from ICM dataset. The dataset assigns a third-
party identity to each conflict management events. This third-party identity includes different 
leaders, states, national and international organizations. Selected countries for the study are 
identified from these third-party identity list and their variables are coded according to their identity 
number. Third-parties containing national and international organizations are neglected from the 
analysis because this study mainly focuses on state’s unique behavior across mediation 
opportunities. Accordingly, the number of mediations are coded according to the total number of 
mediation attempts annually for each state.  
The second dependent variable of this thesis is the mediator rank and position which can be 
an important factor in the mediation process because different types of mediators provide different 
capabilities, motivations and intervention styles. Mediator influences the outcome by using his 
resources, leverage capacity or political authority over conflicted parties. In addition, mediator’s 
rank or position identify the flexibility of management efforts; thus, it has an important effect on 
the success of mediation (Jacob Bercovitch, 1999, p. 190). Taking into consideration of all these 
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reasons, ICM dataset has a broad range of mediator identity as can be seen in Table 4. There are 
three main categories: private individuals, organizations and states. Also, the rank of mediators is 
separated as leaders and senior/lower level representatives. In this study, only state mediation is 
taken into consideration. States have a different political, economic, and military influence in the 
international system. Therefore, ICM dataset distinguishes states as a small and large governments 
according to position in the international community. Dataset benefits Cox-Jacobson scale of 
power relation and the Correlates of War Project’s Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data to 
decide state power (J. Bercovitch & Fretter, 2007, p. 152). However, in this study, only leader of a 
small government and leader of a large government was used as a mediator type. Because it is clear 
that leader mediation receives the most media attention, accordingly, this might be an easy way of 
announcing policy success of governments publicly especially when indicators display a poor 
government performance in domestic politics.  
Table 1: Mediator Rank and Position List from ICM dataset 
(00) No mediation (06) Leader of an international organisation 
(01) Private Individual (07) Representative of a small government 
(02) National organisation (08) Representative of a large government 
(03) Representative of a regional organisation (09) Leader of a small government 
(04) Regional organisation (10) Leader of a large government 
(05) Representative of an international organisation  
  
 The last dependent variable of this study is mediation strategy. The most common mediation 
strategy categorization in mediation literature is: communication-facilitation, procedural, and 
directive strategies (Jacob Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991). These categories demonstrate 
a variance from the weak to strong level intervention model. As can be seen in Table 2, Bercovitch 
also used this categorization in ICM dataset and specified that this mediation tactics was based on 
similar earlier analyses of mediator behavior such as Jones (1989), Touval and Zartman (1985), 
Simkin (1971) and Bercovitch et al, (1991).  Communication-facilitation and procedural strategies 
reflect more passive tactics such as transferring of information between the parties, determining of 
problems and issues, arranging the meeting place, making the organization and attempting to build 
trust between the parties. However, directive strategy is the most active and powerful one. It is an 
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attractive tactic for a mediator who want to take a quick result from the process. With this strategy, 
a mediator generally manipulates opposing parties by showing costs and benefits of their decisions 
clearly. In this categorization, “offered only” mediation strategy means that mediation was offered 
but rejected by the parties, or someone is invited to mediate, but no action was taken. I only include 
directive strategy dummy variable in my dataset, because my hypotheses assume that leaders prefer 
to use strong intervention model to provide a success instantly in the conflict resolution when they 
feel vulnerable in domestic political manner. 
Table 2: Mediation Strategy List from ICM Dataset 
(0) No mediation (3) Procedural 
(1) Mediation Offered Only (4) Directive 
(2) Communication-Facilitation (6) Unspecified 
 
Real GDP growth, election year and anti-government demonstrations are included as 
independent variables in this study. To measure economic performance of government, real GDP 
growth rate is used which gives a more realistic assessment of growth rate. The data is derived 
from the last version of Gleditsch’s (2002) work “Expanded Trade and GDP data”. It includes GDP 
indicators of independent states (1950-2011) which is only available data that covers the time 
period of 1950-2000. Real GDP growth is the annual rate of growth of gross domestic product 
which are adjusted for inflation. Real GDP growth in the previous year is incorporated (in logged 
constant USD dollars) in the regression. 
To test the effect of upcoming elections on the mediation attempts, the measure of the 
election year dummy is used. Cheibub’s (2007) dataset of Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and 
Democracy (PPD) is benefited for identifying presidential and legislative elections of countries on 
an annual base. Election year dummy is coded as “1” for each year if there is a presidential and 
legislative election held in the next year and coded as “0” if there is no election held in the next 
year.  
The other independent variable is the number of anti-government demonstrations and this 
data is derived from Domestic Conflict Events dataset from The Cross-National Time-Series Data 
(CNTS) Archive which is a data set comprised of more than 200 years of annual data from 1815 
21 
 
onward for over 200 countries.4 The frequency of anti-government demonstrations is an indicator 
for public disapproval of government policies. According to the dataset anti-government 
demonstrations are containing “Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary 
purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding 
demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.”5  
Moreover, different variables to control other factors that may matter for mediation 
attempts are accounted. These are CINC score, major power indicator, colonial power indicator, 
regime type, ongoing war indicator and geographical region. CINC score is The Composite Index 
of National Capability which statistically measures national power which ground on military 
personnel and expenditures, iron and steel production and energy consumption, urban and total 
population. This variable is controlled because it is an indicator to present state power and 
Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) found in their study that state power is an asset for mediator 
choice. Additionally, major power indicator is included as a control variable for the same reason 
with CINC score. COW Project’s classification of major powers, where a coding of 1 reflects a 
major power and 0 a minor power, is applied for this variable.6  I also added colonial power 
indicator to check whether being a colonial power has a relationship with being a mediator country 
or not. It is possible that a county’s former colonies encourage it to offer more mediation (Greig & 
Diehl, 2012, p. 88). The other factor that might affect to engage international mediation is regime 
types of countries. Melin (2013) found that state with democratic governance structure is more 
likely to be a mediator. This variable comes from Cheibub’s PPD dataset which is based on the 
effective head of government. Five types of government form are separately coded as dummy 
variables; parliamentary democracies, presidential democracies, civilian dictatorships, military 
dictatorships, and royal dictatorships. In addition, country’s war involvement is included as a 
control variable because it is likely that ongoing war in the country result in decreasing their 
mediation activities. The reason might be governments are less willing to use their available 
resources to other crises. Thus, this probability is controlled by including a dummy variable comes 
                                                          
4 The Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS) was initiated by Arthur S. Banks in 1968 and offers a listing of 
international and national country-data facts. The dataset contains statistical information on a range of countries, 
with data entries ranging from 1815 to the present. https://www.cntsdata.com/the-data, 12.11.2017. 
5 https://www.cntsdata.com/domconflict, 12.11.2017. 
6 Correlates of War Project. 2017. "State System Membership List, v2016." http://correlatesofwar.org, 13.11.2017. 
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from COW War Years Data7 and coded as “1” if there is an extra, interstate or civil war and coded 
as “0” if there is no war within the year. Lastly, geographical region of the country is included as 
a control variable to see if there is a geographical effect on decision of mediation attempts. These 
regions are North and South America, Europe, Asia and Middle East in the dataset and each of 
them coded as a dummy variable. All control variables are added in all regression models as 
robustness check. 
In statistical terms, I expect an interaction such that domestic political issues in the country 
have a significant impact on country’s decision to engaging mediation activity. Large-N statistical 
models are applied in this thesis because it is most appropriate technique to examine a large number 
of cases and have a better external validity. In order to test the theoretical arguments quantitatively, 
linear regression model is used. In addition, the interaction effect technique is used to determine 
the combined effect of election with GDP growth and anti-government demonstrations on 
dependent variables. The interaction effect is the joint effect of independent variables on a 
dependent variable. The presence of an independent variable and its main effect depends on the 
level of another independent variable. As Stevens (1999) argued, if there is an interaction effect, it 
is a mistake to interpret the main effect without seeing it. That’s why it is important to analyze 
whether there is an impact of GDP level or anti-government demonstrations depends on the level 
of the election variable. The population generally accuse government due to poor economic 
performance and punish them in the ballot box. Moreover, as elections near it is likely that 
governments pay more attention to public protest to keep its incumbent position. Thus, it is 
expected that low GDP growth rate or anti-government demonstrations should increase the 
likelihood of mediation attempts when there is an upcoming election. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war, 13.11.2017 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the results of my regression analysis. I first show some descriptive 
statistics as a summary of the dataset. Next, I present the regression models. My unit of analysis is 
country-year and in all regression models, control variables are included (CINC score, regime type, 
ongoing war indicator, geographical region, major power and colonial power indicator). Also, I 
include decade and region fixed effects to control for factors that are constant within a decade or a 
geographical region. 
Descriptive Statistics of Mediation Dataset 
 My dataset includes data from twenty-three OECD countries. When we look at the 
geographical distribution of our dataset, we see that three of these countries are in North and South 
America, sixteen of these are in Europe, one of them is in the Middle East and three of them are in 
Asia. In total, these countries made 748 mediation attempts between the years 1950 and 2000. As 
can be seen in Figure 4, with 381 mediation attempts, the USA takes the leadership by far. It is not 
surprising to see that the USA, which has been a dominant power in the unipolar world since the 
end of the Cold War, is the country which has engaged in the highest number of mediations. 
Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) also report that the USA is the most common mediator for the 
period 1945-1995. In addition, France and the UK are the countries that show the highest amount 
of mediation activity. Common characteristic of these countries is that they are powerful and 
colonial states. Powerful states are the most common mediator type because of their ability to 
provide resources and their political or economic leverage capacity (Todhunter, 2012, p.43). 
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Figure 5 presents the pattern of using mediation across time. A dramatic rise of mediation 
attempts by states took place after the year 1990. Moreover, the graph demonstrates that since the 
end of the Cold War, mediation has become a popular conflict resolution process. It is also an 
important pattern to consider when examining the regression results, because it shows that we need 
to account for the general increase in mediation across time. Another noteworthy point is that US 
and global mediation attempts show similar patterns.  
 
Figure 6 shows that the vast majority of countries that act as mediators come from North 
and South America and Europe. This finding is not surprising since most of the countries that are 
my dataset are in these regions. What is interesting here is that, although there are fewer countries 
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in North and South America than Europe, the number of mediation taking place by these countries 
is more than those in Europe. The reason is the leadership of the USA in state mediation attempts 
in this period. 
 
Figure 7a illustrates the distribution of regime types and the mediation attempts between 
the years 1950 and 2000 with a percentage scale. Remarkably, almost 70% of all of mediation 
attempts were made by presidential democracies even though these countries only make up 30% 
of the dataset. The reason for this might be that the USA is an outlier. Therefore, another figure 
(7b) is added to control the effect of the USA on the dataset. Figure 7b presents the distribution of 
regime type and the mediation attempts by countries in the dataset excluding the USA. As we can 
see, when we exclude the US, although presidential democracies make up about 20% of my dataset, 
they are responsible for 35% of all mediation attempts. It shows us that presidential democracies 
tend to launch a considerable amount of mediation attempts even without the USA effect. In 
addition, without the USA it can be seen more clearly that governments with parliamentary 
democracies launched a great deal of mediation. On the other hand, dictatorial regimes (Mexico 
1950-99, Spain 1950-76, Portugal 1950-75, Poland 1950-88, Hungary 1950-89, Greece 1967-73, 
Turkey 1950-60 / 1980-82) hardly attempted to launch any mediation.  
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Figure 8 presents a comparison for the total number of mediations and the total number of 
anti-government demonstrations between the years 1950 and 2000. Mostly, anti-government 
demonstrations and mediation attempts represent very close numbers in total. However, Mexico 
and Spain are outliers for this pattern; although there are lots of anti-government demonstrations 
within these years, their mediation attempts are very few.   
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Regression Results 
Table 3, 4 and 5 present results of linear regressions that analyze the relationship between 
dependent variables (number of mediation, leader mediation and directive strategy usage and 
independent variables (Real GDP growth, elections, anti-government demonstrations). Hypotheses 
1a, 1b and 1c claim that as economic performance declines, mediation attempts should increase. 
The results indicate that when all other variables held equal, the GDP growth has no significant 
effect on mediation frequency (Table 3).  This result prevents us from making strong claims about 
GDP growth and mediation. However, even if the results are not statistically significant, it is seen 
that there is a positive correlation. Perhaps, political leaders tend to see an opportunity to conduct 
a mediation activity when their country’s economic performance increases. However, regression 
results show no support for Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c.  
Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c claim that as the election is approaching, leaders are more prone 
to announce their policy success publicly in order to gain popularity. Being a mediator is one of 
the least risky choices for a leader who wants to draw attention to foreign policy. So, I expect that 
as elections become closer, number of mediations, leader mediation and directive mediation 
strategies to increase. As can be seen in Table 4, number of mediation attempts and leader 
mediation have a positive correlation with coming elections, which means that leaders see 
mediation as an opportunity for policy success as elections come near. However, the number of 
directive strategy usage has a negative correlation with elections, which means that leaders are not 
interested in being a mediator when elections approach. These relationships are not statically 
significant; therefore, the results suggest that, we cannot say with confidence that election years 
have an effect on mediation attempts.  
Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c focus on the link between public approval for government and 
mediation behavior. If there are more anti-government demonstrations, leaders might feel 
domestically vulnerable. For this reason, it is expected that leaders have incentives to prove their 
ability to solve an international issue or being a leader country in the conflict settlement. Leading 
a mediation attempt can provide a powerful image about government power and its management 
skills. Therefore, it is expected that as the number of anti-government demonstrations rise, 
mediation attempts also increase. However, the regression presents the opposite relation. Table 5 
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provides strong evidence that the impact of anti-government demonstrations on mediation behavior 
is negative, which means that if demonstrations against government are rising, mediation activities 
are decreasing. Thus, these results cannot provide a support for Hypothesis 3a, 3b and 3c.  
In Table 6, I ran a regression that includes all three key independent variables. As it can be 
seen, the results are consistent with other regression results. These results reveal one more time 
that GDP growth and elections have no significant impact on mediation attempts. Moreover, anti-
government demonstrations have a strong negative effect on mediation attempts. It shows that 
when government are faced with strong public disapproval, they are less likely to care about other 
countries’ conflicts. 
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Table 3: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Real GDP Growth  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total 
Mediations 
N of Total Leader 
Mediations 
N of Directive Strategy Usage 
    
Real GDP Growth 0.00807 0.00268 0.00480 
 (0.0160) (0.00201) (0.00682) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.212 -0.0203 -0.0941 
 (0.324) (0.0322) (0.121) 
Presidential Regimes 0.422 0.0227 0.115 
 (0.400) (0.0395) (0.150) 
Ongoing War -0.381 -0.0535 -0.230 
 (0.339) (0.0527) (0.145) 
CINC Score 16.14*** 2.072*** 6.254*** 
 (5.389) (0.556) (2.030) 
Major Power 2.100** 0.228** 0.837** 
 (0.816) (0.0927) (0.321) 
Colonial Power 0.0102 0.00220 -0.000758 
 (0.0171) (0.00220) (0.00729) 
    
Constant -0.956 -0.0865 -0.301 
 (0.574) (0.0606) (0.213) 
    
Observations 1,098 1,098 1,098 
R-squared 0.292 0.138 0.252 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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Table 4: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Election  
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader 
Mediations 
N of Directive Strategy 
Usage 
    
Election -0.0122 -0.000494 -0.0219 
 (0.0539) (0.0217) (0.0228) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.204 -0.0190 -0.0869 
 (0.329) (0.0340) (0.121) 
Presidential Regimes 0.450 0.0274 0.131 
 (0.406) (0.0387) (0.150) 
Ongoing War -0.370 -0.0495 -0.225 
 (0.306) (0.0490) (0.133) 
CINC Score 12.98** 1.659** 5.247** 
 (6.093) (0.659) (2.233) 
Major Power 2.154** 0.234** 0.851** 
 (0.878) (0.101) (0.340) 
Colonial Power 0.00975 0.00208 -0.000825 
 (0.0163) (0.00211) (0.00707) 
    
Constant -0.929 -0.0760 -0.280 
 (0.541) (0.0567) (0.193) 
    
Observations 1,138 1,138 1,138 
R-squared 0.282 0.129 0.245 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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Table 5: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Anti-Government Demonstrations 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader 
Mediations 
N of Directive Strategy Usage 
    
Anti-Government Dem. -0.0797** -0.00684*** -0.0281*** 
 (0.0334) (0.00137) (0.00823) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.258 -0.0235 -0.110 
 (0.326) (0.0321) (0.121) 
Presidential Regimes 0.401 0.0233 0.107 
 (0.410) (0.0413) (0.152) 
Ongoing War -0.282 -0.0419 -0.195* 
 (0.220) (0.0435) (0.107) 
CINC Score 15.39*** 1.867*** 6.087*** 
 (5.407) (0.651) (2.116) 
Major Power 2.153** 0.233** 0.852** 
 (0.859) (0.0992) (0.334) 
Colonial Power 0.0111 0.00220 -0.000349 
 (0.0161) (0.00207) (0.00702) 
    
Constant -1.043 
(0.626) 
-0.0865 
(0.0627) 
-0.320 
(0.220) 
    
Observations 1,132 1,132 1,132 
R-squared 0.287 0.131 0.250 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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Table 6: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader Mediations N of Directive Strategy Usage 
    
Real GDP Growth 0.00749 0.00261 0.00462 
 (0.0163) (0.00257) (0.00690) 
Election -0.0132 0.0130 -0.0243 
 (0.0525) (0.0243) (0.0242) 
Anti-Government Dem. -0.0961** -0.00891*** -0.0335*** 
 (0.0376) (0.00108) (0.00953) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.273 0.00726 -0.111 
 (0.323) (0.0542) (0.118) 
Presidential Regimes 0.367 0.0489 0.103 
 (0.390) (0.0690) (0.147) 
Ongoing War -0.273 -0.0542 -0.193 
 (0.236) (0.0551) (0.113) 
CINC Score 19.47*** 2.090** 7.426*** 
 (4.545) (0.983) (1.862) 
Major Power 2.087** 0.236** 0.832** 
 (0.788) (0.0975) (0.312) 
Colonial Power 0.0119 0.00274 -0.000156 
 (0.0168) (0.00220) (0.00724) 
    
Constant -1.069 -0.143 -0.336 
 (0.671) (0.106) (0.244) 
    
Observations 1,092 907 1,092 
R-squared 0.300 0.144 0.258 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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Previous analyses tested the effect of a single domestic political factor on number of total 
mediation, leader mediation and directive strategy usage in mediation. However, I further tested 
the interaction effect of elections with other independent variables. Tables 7 and 8 show the results 
of these models. In previous analyses, I found that GDP growth and elections have no statistically 
significant effect on mediation attempts. It can only be said that GDP growth and mediation 
attempts are positively correlated with each other, which means that governments have more self-
confidence to be a leader country in a conflict management if their economic performance is high. 
On the other hand, results show that upcoming elections make states engage in more mediation. 
Interactions between these two independent variables, as Table 7 displays, show that their effect 
on mediation behavior is not statically significant. When elections approach and GDP growth 
scores is low, leaders do not prefer to attempt mediation. Therefore, Hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c are 
not supported.  
As previous regression results show, the likelihood of attempting mediation is low when 
there are anti-government demonstrations in the country and this relation is statistically significant. 
It demonstrates the opposite of Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c. However, the strong correlation cannot 
be observed when there is an upcoming election while government is faced with demonstrations 
(Table 8). The regression does not show consistent results, except showing significant negative 
correlation with number of leader mediation. This means that the number of leader mediation 
decreases when the probability of upcoming elections and anti-government demonstrations 
increases. This result fails to provide evidence in support of Hypotheses 5a, 5b and 5c.
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Table 7:  Interactions of Election with Real GDP Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader Mediations N of Directive Strategy Usage 
    
Real GDP Growth 0.00815 0.00273 0.00444 
 (0.0131) (0.00176) (0.00583) 
Election -0.0172 0.00181 -0.0329 
 (0.127) (0.0153) (0.0562) 
Election # Real GDP Growth -0.000325 -0.000233 0.00175 
 (0.0296) (0.00313) (0.0128) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.207 -0.0205 -0.0881 
 (0.327) (0.0340) (0.121) 
Presidential Regimes 0.428 0.0224 0.124 
 (0.392) (0.0376) (0.147) 
Ongoing War -0.381 -0.0535 -0.230 
 (0.338) (0.0526) (0.144) 
CINC Score 16.16*** 2.071*** 6.271*** 
 (5.411) (0.565) (2.031) 
Major Power 2.099** 0.228** 0.836** 
 (0.820) (0.0936) (0.323) 
Colonial Power 0.00990 0.00219 -0.000839 
 (0.0170) (0.00221) (0.00730) 
    
Constant -0.954 -0.0868 -0.297 
 (0.562) (0.0605) (0.206) 
    
Observations 1,098 1,098 1,098 
R-squared 0.292 0.138 0.252 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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Table 8:  Interactions of Election with Anti-Government Demonstrations 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader Mediations N of Directive Strategy Usage 
    
Election -0.000927 0.0108 -0.0199 
 (0.0487) (0.0277) (0.0261) 
Anti-Government Dem. -0.0755* -0.000906 -0.0276** 
 (0.0428) (0.00335) (0.0106) 
Election # Anti-Government Dem. -0.00778 -0.0110** -0.000805 
 (0.0235) (0.00418) (0.00748) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.255 -0.0229 -0.105 
 (0.330) (0.0342) (0.120) 
Presidential Regimes 0.405 0.0246 0.114 
 (0.402) (0.0391) (0.150) 
Ongoing War -0.283 -0.0432 -0.195* 
 (0.220) (0.0465) (0.107) 
CINC Score 15.40*** 1.874** 6.099*** 
 (5.462) (0.692) (2.123) 
Major Power 2.150** 0.231** 0.850** 
 (0.864) (0.0996) (0.335) 
Colonial Power 0.0110 0.00209 -0.000365 
 (0.0162) (0.00209) (0.00705) 
    
Constant -1.045 -0.0907 -0.318 
 (0.623) (0.0648) (0.220) 
    
Observations 1,132 1,132 1,132 
R-squared 0.287 0.132 0.250 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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I ran other regressions to look into the relationship between mediation attempts and my key 
independent variables excluding the US from the sample. The models and control variables are the 
same excluding the USA. As we see in Figures 7a and 7b, the USA has a unique position due to its 
high level of mediation involvement. There might be many different reasons for this; the USA was 
mostly concerned about Soviet Russia’s third-party interventions because these could be a way of 
enhancing the Soviet influence (Touval, 1992, p. 233). The other reason might be that the 
economic, military and political interests of the USA in the world affairs are very critical for their 
government; accordingly, they are more prone to mediate international conflict to keep 
international stability (Touval, 1992, p. 246). It is also clear that the USA is a powerful actor who 
has a lot of military and economic resources. It is important to make all regressions again without 
USA to see if there will be a change in the results. 
Tables 9 and 10 provide the regression results that all other variables held equal, real GDP 
growth and upcoming elections present the same results with previous analysis. Neither factor is 
statistically significant on mediation involvement of states.  
However, a notable change can be found by looking at the anti-government demonstration 
variable (Table 11). Although anti-government demonstrations provide strong and negative 
correlation with mediation attempts in the previous results, without the USA, this variable also 
becomes insignificant. It provides an evidence that the US mediation attempts are less likely when 
there is strong public disapproval. 
In Table 12, all independent variables are included in the regression. This table again shows 
us that without USA none of my key independent variables are significant. Regressions show the 
same results as the other tables that excluding the USA. 
Moreover, the analysis of the interaction between election and the level of real GDP growth 
does not show a strong relationship without the USA (Table 13), which is consistent with previous 
analysis. In Table 11, it can be seen that anti-government demonstrations have no significant effect 
on mediation attempts without the USA. Another test was implemented to control this result by 
adding upcoming elections. Table 14 represents regression results and it can be seen that elections 
have no significant effect on mediation attempts even if there is an uprising against government.  
Tables 13 and 14 show no support for Hypothesis 4a, 4b and 4c.
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Table 9: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Real GDP Growth Excluding the USA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader Mediations N of Directive Strategy Usage 
    
Real GDP Growth 0.00401 0.00173 0.00242 
 (0.00946) (0.00122) (0.00386) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.0429 -0.00426 -0.0312 
 (0.0976) (0.0137) (0.0339) 
Presidential Regimes 0.0124 -0.0136 -0.0333 
 (0.136) (0.0148) (0.0524) 
Ongoing War -0.0147 0.00951 -0.0736 
 (0.0813) (0.0236) (0.0428) 
CINC Score -3.951 0.569 -0.934 
 (4.839) (0.421) (1.379) 
Major Power 1.789*** 0.175*** 0.709*** 
 (0.262) (0.0348) (0.106) 
Colonial Power 0.00849 0.00225 -0.00157 
 (0.0117) (0.00166) (0.00593) 
    
Constant -0.215 -0.0156 -0.0337 
 (0.130) (0.0177) (0.0609) 
    
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.277 0.108 0.184 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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Table 10: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Election Excluding the USA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader Mediations N of Directive Strategy Usage 
    
Election -0.0613 -0.0147 -0.0260 
 (0.0414) (0.0176) (0.0221) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.0356 -0.000969 -0.0273 
 (0.0997) (0.0135) (0.0322) 
Presidential Regimes 0.0337 -0.00678 -0.0228 
 (0.134) (0.0187) (0.0480) 
Ongoing War -0.0414 0.00807 -0.0826* 
 (0.0901) (0.0236) (0.0458) 
CINC Score -4.724 0.444 -1.087 
 (5.021) (0.384) (1.408) 
Major Power 1.759*** 0.169*** 0.696*** 
 (0.268) (0.0364) (0.108) 
Colonial Power 0.00794 0.00212 -0.00167 
 (0.0114) (0.00164) (0.00580) 
    
Constant -0.186 -0.00636 -0.0216 
 (0.145) (0.0187) (0.0554) 
    
Observations 1,088 1,088 1,088 
R-squared 0.273 0.102 0.183 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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Table 11: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Anti-Government Dem. Excluding the USA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader Mediations N of Directive Strategy Usage 
    
Anti-Government Dem. 0.0280 -0.00169 -0.000438 
 (0.0361) (0.00236) (0.0135) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.0311 -0.00590 -0.0343 
 (0.0829) (0.0139) (0.0319) 
Presidential Regimes 0.0325 -0.0131 -0.0324 
 (0.143) (0.0166) (0.0539) 
Ongoing War -0.0407 0.00836 -0.0819* 
 (0.0875) (0.0232) (0.0453) 
CINC Score -5.575 0.493 -1.083 
 (5.000) (0.388) (1.389) 
Major Power 1.750*** 0.170*** 0.697*** 
 (0.270) (0.0369) (0.110) 
Colonial Power 0.00734 0.00213 -0.00170 
 (0.0112) (0.00165) (0.00575) 
    
Constant -0.231 -0.0108 -0.0343 
 (0.149) (0.0215) (0.0575) 
    
Observations 1,082 1,082 1,082 
R-squared 0.273 0.101 0.182 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
 
  
  
41 
 
 
Table 12: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables Excluding the USA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader Mediations N of Directive Strategy Usage 
    
Real GDP Growth 0.00405 0.00161 0.00240 
 (0.00932) (0.00166) (0.00382) 
Election -0.0595 -0.00433 -0.0252 
 (0.0444) (0.0186) (0.0223) 
Anti-Government Dem. 0.0264 -0.000851 -0.000987 
 (0.0360) (0.00325) (0.0137) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.00863 0.0297* -0.0262 
 (0.0887) (0.0154) (0.0284) 
Presidential Regimes 0.0514 0.0177 -0.0261 
 (0.137) (0.0199) (0.0514) 
Ongoing War -0.0160 0.0221 -0.0735* 
 (0.0791) (0.0377) (0.0427) 
CINC Score -4.801 0.628 -0.916 
 (4.754) (0.440) (1.351) 
Major Power 1.777*** 0.167*** 0.709*** 
 (0.264) (0.0381) (0.107) 
Colonial Power 0.00782 0.00252 -0.00160 
 (0.0115) (0.00169) (0.00589) 
    
Constant -0.246* -0.0611** -0.0395 
 (0.135) (0.0236) (0.0633) 
    
Observations 1,044 859 1,044 
R-squared 0.278 0.114 0.185 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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Table 13: Interactions of Election with Real GDP Growth Excluding the USA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader Mediations N of Directive Strategy Usage 
    
Election -0.0458 -0.00847 -0.0164 
 (0.125) (0.0137) (0.0367) 
Real GDP Growth 0.00469 0.00195 0.00288 
 (0.00781) (0.00134) (0.00405) 
Election # Real GDP Growth -0.00296 -0.00103 -0.00209 
 (0.0245) (0.00211) (0.00892) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.0284 -0.00102 -0.0248 
 (0.0992) (0.0141) (0.0302) 
Presidential Regimes 0.0327 -0.00897 -0.0242 
 (0.132) (0.0183) (0.0483) 
Ongoing War -0.0161 0.00916 -0.0743 
 (0.0814) (0.0239) (0.0433) 
CINC Score -3.908 0.585 -0.901 
 (4.822) (0.404) (1.360) 
Major Power 1.786*** 0.174*** 0.708*** 
 (0.260) (0.0351) (0.106) 
Colonial Power 0.00856 0.00227 0.00227 
 (0.0117) (0.00166) (0.00166) 
    
Constant -0.211 -0.0151 -0.0327 
 (0.137) (0.0174) (0.0629) 
    
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 
R-squared 0.277 0.108 0.185 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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Table 14: Interactions of Election with Anti-Government Demonstrations Excluding the USA 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader Mediations N of Directive Strategy Usage 
Election -0.115* -0.0178 -0.0467 
 (0.0565) (0.0173) (0.0385) 
Anti-Government Dem. 0.0151 -0.00239 -0.00538 
 (0.0227) (0.00261) (0.00934) 
Election # Anti-Government Dem. 0.0820 0.00449 0.0315 
 (0.0948) (0.00403) (0.0348) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.00576 -0.00169 -0.0240 
 (0.0786) (0.0143) (0.0271) 
Presidential Regimes 0.0661 -0.00743 -0.0186 
 (0.143) (0.0198) (0.0524) 
Ongoing War -0.0417 0.00825 -0.0823* 
 (0.0876) (0.0236) (0.0452) 
CINC Score -5.763 0.481 -1.156 
 (5.018) (0.387) (1.393) 
Major Power 1.746*** 0.170*** 0.695*** 
 (0.265) (0.0367) (0.108) 
Colonial Power 0.00756 0.00215 -0.00160 
 (0.0111) (0.00164) (0.00577) 
    
Constant -0.211 -0.00843 -0.0264 
 (0.146) (0.0207) (0.0573) 
    
Observations 1,082 1,082 1,082 
R-squared 0.275 0.102 0.184 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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As we see in Figure 7a and 7b, democracies constitute a majority in my dataset and 
democratic countries are the most preferred mediators. Therefore, I ran a regression only with 
democratic countries to purify the results from non-democratic period of OECD countries. This 
regression includes mediation attempts and all independent variables (Table 15). The results are 
the same with previous analyses; real GDP growth and upcoming elections are not statistically 
significant factors on mediation attempts and only anti-government demonstrations present strong 
but negative relationship with independent variables. 
Table 15: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables in Democratic Countries 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total 
Mediations 
N of Total Leader 
Mediations 
N of Directive Strategy 
Usage 
    
Real GDP Growth 0.00749 0.00261 0.00462 
 (0.0163) (0.00257) (0.00690) 
Election -0.0132 0.0130 -0.0243 
 (0.0525) (0.0243) (0.0242) 
Anti-Government Dem. -0.0961** -0.00891*** -0.0335*** 
 (0.0376) (0.00108) (0.00953) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.273 0.00726 -0.111 
 (0.323) (0.0542) (0.118) 
Presidential Regimes 0.367 0.0489 0.103 
 (0.390) (0.0690) (0.147) 
Ongoing War -0.273 -0.0542 -0.193 
 (0.236) (0.0551) (0.113) 
CINC Score 19.47*** 2.090** 7.426*** 
 (4.545) (0.983) (1.862) 
Major Power 2.087** 0.236** 0.832** 
 (0.788) (0.0975) (0.312) 
Colonial Power 0.0119 0.00274 -0.000156 
 (0.0168) (0.00220) (0.00724) 
    
Constant -1.069 -0.143 -0.336 
 (0.671) (0.106) (0.244) 
    
Observations 1,092 907 1,092 
R-squared 0.300 0.144 0.258 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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After I measure the relationship between mediation attempts and the independent variables 
in democratic countries, I decided to make regressions separately for Parliamentary and 
Presidential Democracies to see the difference. Table 16 includes regression results for the 
relationship between mediation attempts and all independent variables in Presidential Regimes and 
Table 17 only includes variables for Parliamentary Regimes. As we see in both tables, real GDP 
growth, Elections and Anti-Government Demonstrations have no statistically significant 
relationship with mediation attempts.  
 
Table 16: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables in Presidential Regimes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader 
Mediations 
N of Directive Strategy 
Usage 
    
Real GDP Growth 0.0505 0.00491 0.0672 
 (0.202) (0.0351) (0.0854) 
Election -0.0229 0.0449 -0.236* 
 (0.329) (0.106) (0.0717) 
Anti-Government Dem. -0.0466 -0.00324 -0.00236 
 (0.0179) (0.00334) (0.00981) 
    
Ongoing War -0.728* -0.186 -0.464*** 
 (0.234) (0.0646) (0.0452) 
CINC Score -51.10* -4.742 -23.66*** 
 (13.91) (2.731) (2.287) 
Major Power 4.755** 0.495** 1.733** 
 (0.612) (0.0564) (0.214) 
Colonial Power - - - 
    
Constant -2.534 -0.308 -0.304 
 (2.549) (0.529) (0.468) 
    
Observations 114 114 114 
R-squared 0.540 0.234 0.496 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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Figure 4 shows us that between 1950 and 2000, most of the mediation attempts were made 
by to the USA, France and United Kingdom. Therefore, I ran a regression includes the variables 
only for these three countries. Table 18 present the results of this regression. Real GDP growth 
and election do not represent statistically consistent relationship. Some models show positive and 
significant relationship between variables while others do not and this prevents us from making a 
strong claim about the relationship between mediation attempts and real GDP growth and election. 
However, anti-government relationship has strong and negative relationship just like previous 
analysis. It means when anti-government demonstrations increase, the probability of mediation 
attempts decrease in the USA, France and United Kingdom. Also, in Table 19, I made a regression 
Table 17: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables in Parliamentary Regimes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader 
Mediations 
N of Directive Strategy 
Usage 
    
Real GDP Growth 0.0157 0.00543 0.00660 
 (0.0227) (0.00314) (0.0103) 
Election -0.152* 0.00681 -0.0502 
 (0.0745) (0.0370) (0.0374) 
Anti-Government Dem. -0.0156 -0.00220 -0.0233 
 (0.0289) (0.00471) (0.0195) 
    
Ongoing War -0.129 0.0208 -0.134* 
 (0.115) (0.0307) (0.0690) 
CINC Score -3.664 0.948 -1.252 
 (4.008) (0.608) (1.403) 
Major Power 1.139 -0.00300 0.766 
 (0.775) (0.117) (0.439) 
Colonial Power 0.00894 0.00307 -0.00272 
 (0.0136) (0.00211) (0.00722) 
    
Constant -0.274 -0.0457 0.0369 
 (0.424) (0.0538) (0.215) 
    
Observations 445 444 445 
R-squared 0.305 0.124 0.200 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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for the rest of the countries excluding the USA, France and United Kingdom. The results remained 
the same, only anti-government demonstrations present strong and negative relationship with 
independent variables. 
Table 18: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables in USA, UK and France 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader 
Mediations 
N of Directive Strategy 
Usage 
    
Real GDP Growth 0.0430 0.00754* 0.0209 
 (0.0341) (0.00394) (0.0143) 
Election -0.105 0.00111 -0.0835* 
 (0.0737) (0.0367) (0.0432) 
Anti-Government Dem. -0.0953*** -0.00861*** -0.0325*** 
 (0.0225) (0.00120) (0.00569) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.0752 0.000682 -0.0712 
 (0.222) (0.0356) (0.0767) 
Presidential Regimes 0.0301 -0.00135 -0.0955 
 (0.677) (0.0990) (0.226) 
Ongoing War -0.464 -0.0638 -0.279** 
 (0.282) (0.0510) (0.127) 
CINC Score -38.38** -3.369 -14.47** 
 (17.09) (2.050) (6.519) 
Major Power 1.828* 0.159 0.897** 
 (1.008) (0.136) (0.400) 
Colonial Power 0.0119 0.00237 -0.000156 
 (0.0168) (0.00215) (0.00724) 
    
Constant -0.0881 0.0512 0.116 
 (0.644) (0.0822) (0.265) 
    
Observations 620 620 620 
R-squared 0.432 0.193 0.369 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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Table 19: Relationship Between Mediation Attempts and Independent Variables Excluding USA, UK and 
France 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES N of Total Mediations N of Total Leader 
Mediations 
N of Directive Strategy 
Usage 
    
Real GDP Growth  0.0430 0.00754* 0.0209 
 (0.0341) (0.00394) (0.0143) 
Election -0.105 0.00111 -0.0835* 
 (0.0737) (0.0367) (0.0432) 
Anti-Government Dem. -0.0953*** -0.00861*** -0.0325*** 
 (0.0225) (0.00120) (0.00569) 
    
Parliamentary Regimes -0.0752 0.000682 -0.0712 
 (0.222) (0.0356) (0.0767) 
Presidential Regimes 0.0301 -0.00135 -0.0955 
 (0.677) (0.0990) (0.226) 
Ongoing War -0.464 -0.0638 -0.279** 
 (0.282) (0.0510) (0.127) 
CINC Score -38.38** -3.369 -14.47** 
 (17.09) (2.050) (6.519) 
Major Power 1.828* 0.159 0.897** 
 (1.008) (0.136) (0.400) 
Colonial Power 0.0119 0.00237 -0.000156 
 (0.0168) (0.00215) (0.00724) 
    
Constant -0.0881 0.0512 0.116 
 (0.644) (0.0822) (0.265) 
    
Observations 620 620 620 
R-squared 0.432 0.193 0.369 
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region and decade dummies are excluded from the table. 
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Referring to an earlier literature, a series of control variables (CINC score, regime type, 
ongoing war indicator, geographical region, major power and colonial power indicator) were 
examined to see whether the models are plausible or not.  Control variables including region and 
decade fixed effects are included in all regressions. Their results are consistent across all regression 
models. Regression results of control variables present some interesting findings. All regression 
models with control variables are included in the supplementary appendix.   
The results show that National Capability score (CINC) has a statistically significant and 
positive correlation with the number of mediation, leader mediation and directive strategy usage. 
By looking at this result, we can say that engaging in a mediation process has a strong correlation 
with government’s leverage. Results also show that the coefficient for the major power indicator 
is positive in all models, which means that major powers are more likely to attempt mediation. 
States with greater capabilities are able to engage in more mediation. Apart from these results, 
regression analysis found evidence that Middle East Region variable is strongly correlated with 
the number of mediation and leader mediation. We do not observe this pattern for directive strategy 
usage variable. In my dataset, there is only one country from Middle East which is Turkey. Other 
control variables are not statistically significant. 
I also include a decade variable to capture possible decade effect. In all regression models, 
results show that the 1990s decade are statistically significant, implying that, other things held 
equal, in 1990s mediation attempts increased. Therefore, the result captures a common factor that 
affects all countries in that time period. It is already known, in the post-Cold War period, mediation 
has become a popular conflict resolution method (Jacob Bercovitch & Jackson, 2009b; Todhunter, 
2012).  
Control variables in the regression models excluding the USA show us mostly same results 
with the other regressions. The most notable difference is that CINC score is not a significant 
factor for mediation attempts according to these results. It means the USA changes the effect of 
the CINC score variable. However, being a major power is still an important predictor of 
mediation. Also, the 1990s-decade variable is still strongly correlated with mediation attempts. As 
with previous regression models, other control variables are not statistically significant. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I evaluate the hypothesis that third-party mediation attempts by countries are 
shaped by their domestic political situations. My findings do not support this hypothesis. There is 
no evidence to suggest that when government performs poorly, leaders are more likely to become 
a mediator. I found a strong negative relationship between anti-government demonstrations and 
mediation attempts, which is contrary to my hypothesis. My empirical results show that if there 
are anti-government demonstrations in a country, then that country becomes less likely to attempt 
mediation elsewhere. Although the regression results are not supportive for my hypotheses, this 
thesis contributes to the literature in some ways. First, I show that being a major power in 
international arena has a strong relationship with being a mediator country. Second, I provide 
evidence that the USA has a unique mediator position for engaging in international conflicts. In 
addition, the results show that there was a general rise of mediation attempts in 1990s. 
There may be a number of reasons for why I do not find a relationship between domestic 
factors and mediation attempts. First, the operationalization of my dependent and independent 
variables might not appropriate for my regression analyses. Second, I might be using the wrong 
indicators for domestic performance of governments from the beginning. For example, I analyzed 
the number of anti-government demonstration as a public approval indicator because there is no 
consistent public approval dataset cross nationally. However, Todhunter (2012) used public 
approval rates from Gallup survey data when analyze the US mediation attempts. Therefore, the 
results might be different with better data and better operationalization.  
Despite the weak evidence, this study contributes to the literature. This study reveals that 
the literature on foreign policy and mediation is needed to bring together. There are few studies 
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that address third-party mediation as an instrument of foreign policy. However, it is important to 
examine mediation from this approach because then we will have better understanding of what 
motivates countries to become a mediator. In addition, this study reflects only OECD countries’ 
experience. It would also be useful to expand the range of countries and years for more generalized 
results. 
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